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 Abstract: 
 
We argue that trust can be incentivised by measures which increase the ability of trusters 
to protect themselves against risk. We work within the framework originally established 
by Berg et al (1995) in which trust is measured experimentally as the ability to generate 
reciprocity in response to an initial offer of money within a two-person game. An 
incentive is conveyed both by means of variations in the multiplier applied to the first 
player’s initial offer and by giving the first player the opportunity to insure themselves 
against the possibility that the second player will fail to reciprocate their initial offer. 
Measured trust is strongly responsive to both these incentives. Thus third parties have the 
ability to influence the outcome of the game, not only, as in the analysis of Charness et al 
(2008), by punishing failure to reciprocate and rewarding ‘good’ initial offers, but also by 
offering protection which strengthens the first player’s risk efficacy, or ratio of assets to 
risk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 There is now a large literature attesting to the importance of social capital, and 
specifically of interpersonal trust, in determining the level of economic efficiency and 
economic development.  Following Putnam’s demonstration (1993) of the importance of 
social networks in determining relative rates of development in northern and southern 
Italy, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Whiteley (2000) have demonstrated statistically that 
indices of trust are significantly correlated with inter-country variations in economic 
growth, and La Porta et al. (1997) have shown that trust is positively associated with 
judicial efficiency and the absence of corruption.  As the literature has developed, so a 
range of alternative measures of trust has evolved. The original practice of assessing trust 
by means of attitudinal questions (such as the World Values Survey’s ‘Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful 
in dealing with people?’ 1) has been supplemented by more precise and easier-to-interpret 
experimental methods, which have been used to measure trust and its correlates in 
environments as diverse as Zimbabwean resettlement schemes (Barr 2003), Ugandan 
villages (Mosley and Verschoor 2005) and the Harvard first-year economics classroom 
(Glaeser et al. 2000). From these experimental studies have come a range of findings on 
the correlates of trust, which suggest, in particular, that trust levels tend to be higher 
amongst the better-off, the more educated, older people, and those in denser social 
networks. 
  
The big gap which remains in all of the literature is the question of how trust-
relationships are encouraged, made and broken. Even if we know that richer and more 
educated individuals and societies trust one another more than the poorer and less 
educated, we do not know why, nor do we know a great deal about the processes by 
which distrust can be turned into trust, either in the political or in the interpersonal 
sphere. One interesting aspect of this is the role, if any, of market processes in 
incentivising trust. For whereas markets exist for most factors of production which are 
                                               
1 World Values Survey  page 3, available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
significant in the development process, such as labour, physical capital and human 
capital, trust, a scarce resource though it is, is classically a commodity which cannot be 
bought with money. More intriguingly still, the application of standard non-market 
methods for increasing the degree of public trust in services – such as the increasingly 
tough audit procedures being used for ‘quality assurance’ in health and education which 
often turn out not to increase the degree of trust that the public profess in that service 
(O’Neill, 2002). The question of what actually will motivate trust, and what will 
demotivate it, is therefore germane. In this paper we tackle this question by comparative 
experimental analysis of the determinants of trust and of trust-building processes.  
 
Our definition of trust is confined to that of generalised trust: trusting behaviour 
occurs between individuals who have no previous knowledge of each other.2  This 
definition excludes particularised trust as defined by Berggren et al (2006), which is trust 
between individuals who do have previous knowledge of one another. Our point of 
departure is that generalised trust increases our vulnerability to the actions of others; that 
is, it exposes us to an increased risk that others will exploit us, in the hope of deriving 
benefit from the possibility that they will do the opposite and behave in a mutually 
equitable manner. Thus, a situation in which trust between two individuals does not exist 
because of mutual fears about possible exploitation by others may be replaced by a 
situation in which those fears are discounted sufficiently for a trusting interchange to 
occur. Like Berggren et al (2006) we believe that institutions do influence the level of 
generalised trust and the idea which we explore here is that an element of distrust can be 
removed by the discovery, or the deliberate provision, of evidence which reduces the 
costs of trusting for the truster. The literature on this point (eg Berg et al 1995, Glaeser et 
al. 2000, Barr 2003) treats trust-increasing evidence as coming from the truster’s past 
‘social history’, that is her personal background and her experience of other people 
including the trustee, but as stated above with generalised trust there is no ‘social history’ 
on which to base a judgement.  
 
                                               
2 For an overview of generalised versus particularised trust see Berggren et al (2006). 
We posit that trusting behaviour may derive from sources which do not relate to 
evidence from the past. Here we focus on the trust between specifically identified 
individuals, or dyadic trust (Hudson 2006), who have no history on which to base any 
judgment of each other. In particular, trust may be induced because the trustee provides a 
pledge of future good behaviour which is believed, or because she or a third party 
provides a material incentive, such as insurance against betrayal, which reduces the costs 
of trusting for the truster. We call trust induced by this means incentivised trust. 
Incentivised trust is trust which derives from the provision of evidence which increases 
the truster’s risk efficacy, or the reserves which the truster has at her disposal to cope with 
breach of trust, by contrast with affective trust (Faulkner 2008) in which the truster feels 
betrayed if her expectations of the trustee’s behaviour are not met. Two examples of 
incentivised trust are guarantees given to consumers to refund the purchase money on 
defective goods, which encourage uncertain consumers into the market, and peer-
monitoring arrangements, which act as bona-fides to encourage uncertain lenders to lend 
even to those without collateral. 
 
 
II.  EXISTING LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 There is a large literature surrounding the concept of trust, ranging from the 
determinants of trust (Glaeser et al 2000; Barr 2003, Fahr and Irlenbusch 2008), to the 
link with social capital and its formation (Berggren et al (2006), the effects of trust and 
social capital on business and economic growth (Putnam 1993; La Porta et al 1997; 
Knack and Keefer 1997; Woolcock 1998; Zak and Knack 2001: Duffner et al 2009) and 
the value of trusting behaviour for the wellbeing of society (Hudson 2006). However, 
none of this literature has examined the issue of whether the amount of trust can be 
increased, or decreased, by material incentives. In this paper we examine this issue using 
an experimental approach.  
Much of the burgeoning experimental literature on trust consists of variations on the 
classic two-person ‘reciprocity game’ of Berg et al (‘BDM’)(1995)3. In this game, the 
                                               
3
 For reviews of results from the BDM game see Barr (2003) and Mosley and Verschoor (2005). 
first player, player A, is handed an initial amount of money, average $10, of which she 
can allocate any proportion to a player B whom she cannot see or contact. This amount is 
then tripled by the experimenter, playing the role of banker, to give player B an incentive 
to invest in her, and player B then decides how much of this tripled amount to give back. 
Later variations on this model, both in the form of computer simulations (Anderhub et al 
2002; Cox 2004) and empirical experiments (Glaeser 2003; Charness et al 2008; Cochard 
et al 2004), have repeated the basic two-shot BDM game one or more times, and in some 
cases revealed players’ identities to one another, with a view to increasing the amount of 
information available to trusters as they decide how much trust to give to the trustee.  An 
important further step forward is taken by Charness et al (2008), who introduce into the 
game a third party empowered to punish a responder who has been excessively selfish, 
which is one way of incentivising trust. They find that these penalties have a strong and 
significant effect on the amounts offered by and returned to player A.  
 
We develop the approach of Charness et al (2008), allowing the experimenter, instead 
of imposing penalties for those who do not reciprocate, to offer rewards for those who do. 
We do this in two ways, first by varying the multiple by which player A’s initial offer is 
multiplied as it reaches player B, and second by offering player A insurance against the 
possibility that her initial offer will not be reciprocated. Both of these incentives offer 
some compensation against the possibility of trust not being reciprocated, which acts as 
an incentive to the first mover, player A, to cultivate a reputation for being trustworthy.  
 
The size of the multiplier may incentivise player A to offer player B a larger amount 
in the hope that player B will return a higher positive amount. For example, if we assume 
a 50 percent probability of player B returning half of player A’s multiplied offer, a 
multiplier of 4 implies that an offer of £5 from player A gives player B £20 and £5 would 
be the average return whereas a multiplier of 2 implies that an offer of £5 from player A 
gives player B £10 but only £2.50 would be returned on average. Therefore we state our 
first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  The larger the multiplier the greater the amount offered by player A. 
 If player A can insure against any losses he may initially offer a greater amount than 
previously because his defences against the risk of potential exploitation, or risk efficacy, 
are enhanced. Thus our second hypothesis is: 
 
H2:  Player A will offer a greater proportion of his available amount to offer to player 
B if he has protection against his vulnerability. 
 
Player B has no information about player A. The only signal he actually receives is the 
amount sent by player A. If player A sends a large proportion of the amount available to 
send to player B, player B may determine that player A is trusting and acknowledge this 
signal by returning a higher amount.  Thus our third hypothesis is: 
 
H3: Player B will return a larger proportion of his amount available to return where 
player A has offered a high proportion of his available amount to send. 
 
We have included an insurance game in which player A is given the opportunity to insure 
against losses should player B choose not to return any money. If risk averse, and hence 
not trusting of player B, player A would always choose to insure against losses. With 
insurance against losses player A would then offer player B his remaining balance in 
order to take full advantage of the multiplier. Thus our fourth hypothesis is:  
 
H4: If offered insurance against losses, Player A will take out insurance and offer 
player B his remaining balance.  
 
 
 
III.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND DATA 
 
As in Glaeser et al. (2000) we use a combination of survey and experimental 
methods. In our experiments, we replicate the original ‘reciprocity game’ of Berg et al 
(1995), and use exactly their definition of trust, but vary the game in three ways. First, we 
use an expanded version of the pre-survey to elicit information about the causes of 
creation or erosion of trust. Second, we vary the multiplier for reciprocal ‘trusting’ 
behaviour: an equal number of Player B respondents received double, triple and four 
times the original Player A offer. And third, we incentivise trusting behaviour by 
introducing an opportunity for player A to insure against losses. 
 
Altogether 90 investment games were conducted in December 2005 and February 
2006. Three hundred and fifty undergraduate and postgraduate students in the 
departments of economics at the universities of Sheffield and Glasgow were emailed to 
invite them to take part in the experiment. Those students who indicated that they would 
like to participate in the experiments were provided with a pre-game survey questionnaire 
to complete (see Appendix A) which used as point of departure that administered by 
Glaeser et al (2000).  The questions asked included typical personal and family 
background characteristics such as age, ethnicity, parental education and income 
(captured as a one-zero variable by inquiring whether the student had taken the maximum 
available student loan). In addition, we wished to assess the individual’s level of altruism, 
personal social capital, and political attitudes, captured through questions on immigration 
levels and capital punishment. Finally, we included a question from the World Values 
Survey standardly used to measure trust scores on a cross-sectional basis: 
 
 ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people’? 
 
In total 180 students responded to the questionnaire, a response rate of just over fifty 
percent. Individuals who completed the survey questionnaire were invited to take part in 
the experiment. This enabled us to play 90 games, 54 games in Sheffield and 36 in 
Glasgow, using in each case a double-blind procedure similar to that employed in the 
‘BDM’ game and to that of Cochard et al (2004). Nine of these games were single-shot 
games (one offer from player A, and one response from player B);   in the remaining 81 
cases, this basic game was repeated, with the opportunity for player A to purchase 
insurance against lack of reciprocity being offered in 35 of these cases. This insurance 
offer, communicated to player A’s only, was made in the form: 
‘Do you wish to consider taking out insurance, to cover the possibility that you may not 
receive from player B as much as you offered?’ 
 If you pay a premium of £1 you will get back the full amount you offered minus the 
premium should player B not return the full amount of your offer. If you pay a premium 
of 50p you will get back half of the amount you offered, minus the premium, if player B 
returns less than the amount you offered. 
 
For each game our subjects were randomly selected to be either ‘player A’ or ‘player 
B’ and seated in separate rooms. No players knew the identity of the person with whom 
they were playing: only the experimenter and the monitor were aware of this as they 
passed the offers between each player. Each player received an initial endowment of £5, 
and the amount given by player A to player B was, with equal likelihood, multiplied by a 
factor of either 2, 3 or 4, in order to vary the incentive to trust. The ratio of the amount 
given to player B by player A to his/her initial endowment was recorded. Similarly the 
amount returned by player B to player A was recorded by the experimenter and the ratio 
of the amount given to the amount available to give was calculated. In round 2 of the 
repeated games both players received a second amount of £5 which was added to their 
current balance at that point and the game play was repeated.  In the insurance game, 
player A was offered, in both rounds, the opportunity to insure against the possibility of 
being ‘exploited’ by player B – i.e. having his offer not reciprocated. This insurance took 
the form of an insurance premium of either £1 or 50p to cover all or half the amount ‘lost 
to exploitation’, as described in the previous paragraph4. We focus our attention on 
analysis of our repeated games in this paper and especially on the behaviour of player A 
when he faces the opportunity to insure against losses, for the main reason stated by Cox 
(2004 p262) that “…the single-game experimental designs used to generate the data in 
these experiments do not discriminate between actions motivated by trust or reciprocity 
…” Table 1 below shows summary statistics for our single games and repeated games. 
                                               
4 We do not concern ourselves with the strict definition of fair and unfair insurance in this paper. We are 
more concerned with the opportunity player A has to insure against losses. 
Table 1: Summary statistics for all games. 
 Repeated games N=81 Single game N=9 
Final balance player A(£) 14.30 8.36 
Final balance player B (£) 18.79 14.22 
Final balance joint (£) 33.10 22.58 
Player A: ratio of initial  offer to 
initial endowment 
0.77 0.72 
Player B: ratio of first-round return 
to first-round endowment (after 
multiplier applied) 
0.44 0.29 
Player A: ratio of second-round 
offer to second-round endowment 
0.40 - 
Player B: ratio of second-round 
offer to second-round endowment  
0.31 - 
Proportion male 0.63 0.67 
Proportion on maximum loan (ie 
with relatively low incomes) 
0.07 0 
Proportion postgraduate 0.56 0.44 
World Values Survey trust- 
 measure5 
3.05 2.89 
 % who would/do vote in elections   26     33 
 
 
IV.  RESULTS 
 Consistent with the findings of other investigations (Cochard et al 2004), we see 
from the summary statistics shown in Table 1 that the ratio of the amount offered by 
player A, and that returned by player B, is greater in the repeated game than in the single 
game. Table 2 shows the mean statistics for all our games separately. Our figures reveal 
                                               
5 This measures answers to the question:  
‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people’?  measured on a five point Likert scale. 
 
similar final balances for both individuals, separately and jointly between the non-
insurance game and the insurance game where player A did not take up the opportunity to 
insure. In all our games, we find that in the first round of play the ratio of the offer made 
to the amount available to offer made by player A is greater than the ratio in the second 
round of play, which can be explained in terms of a reputation effect: players learn 
through the rounds to do as they expect to be done by. In addition, in the first round of 
play the ratio of the return made by player B to the amount available to offer is always 
greater than the ratio in the second round of play. This can be explained by the 
reciprocity hypothesis; player B seeks, in the spirit of mutual signalling, to maximize the 
joint payoff, to entice player A to offer a high amount in the subsequent period. The final 
return made by player B does not need to indicate trust and player B may be opportunistic 
in the end game, a result found by others (Anderhub et al 2002; Cochard et al 2004).  
 
Table 2: Mean statistics for repeated games with and without insurance 
 No insurance Insurance game 
  
N = 46 
Not taken 
N= 18 
Insurance taken 
N= 17 
Final balance player 1 13.30 13.11 17.34 
Final balance player 2 18.33 17.33 20.18 
Final balance joint 31.63 30.44 37.51 
Ratio 1 player A offer 1 0.77 0.70 0.80 
Ratio 2 player B return 1  0.43 0.39 0.51 
Ratio 3 player A offer 2 0.38 0.37 0.40 
Ratio 4 player B return 2 0.33 0.29 0.33 
Mean of means taking multiplication factor of offer into account 
In our first two hypotheses we are particularly interested in how player A behaves, 
and in how he responds to incentives which enable him to increase his risk efficacy and 
protect himself against potential exploitation. Table 3 reports the difference in player A‘s 
offer in respect of each round according to the multiplication factor to which the reward 
is subject. A clear pattern is observable: whilst the ratio of the second offer is always 
below that of the first offer, it clearly increases with the level of reward. Thus it appears 
that trusting behaviour is not a constant, but is affected by the level of payoff, consistent 
with hypothesis H1 that the greater the multiplier the larger is the amount offered by 
player A.  
If player A can insure against losses he will have protection against his vulnerability 
and will try to maximise the amount that may be returned to him. We suggest that this 
demonstrates a strategy of attempting to maximise one’s own payoff: the higher offer 
made by player A signals trust in, and a sense of fair play towards, player B but is 
conditioned and incentivised by the fact that he is insured. Hypothesis H2, that player A 
will offer more of his amount if he has protection from vulnerability, receives some 
support from the behaviour of some player A’s in our game. However, some player A’s, 
even though insured, did not give all their possible funds available to player B. This may 
be because some player A’s were inequality- averse and realised that if player B did not 
return a positive amount then they would be considerably worse off in relation to the final 
balance of player B. 
 
Table 3: Player A behaviour when insurance taken, classified by multiplication 
factor applied to Player A’s offer. 
 Multiplication factor Mean proportion 
Ratio1 player A offer1 X2 0.70 
Ratio3 player A offer2 X2 0.30 
Ratio1 player A offer1 X3 0.82 
Ratio3 player A offer2 X3 0.48 
Ratio1 player A offer1 X4 0.94 
Ratio3 player A offer2 X4 0.53 
 
Tables 4a and 4b reveal estimates for simple regressions of the log of the final 
balance of player A and the log of the joint balance for the insurance games in an attempt 
to understand whether ‘reciprocal trust’, in the sense of participants’ combined final 
balances, can be seen as incentivised by the level of reward and by the opportunity to 
insure against losses, controlling for the ratio of amount offered and returned to the 
amount available at each stage. We build our final specification by adding one variable at 
a time, which enables us to check the robustness of our estimates.  Our results 
demonstrate that all estimates are indeed robust across specifications.6 
  
 Table 4a Player A - repeated game with insurance 
Dependent variable = Ln Final balance player 1. OLS estimation 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
N=35 games  Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Level of reward 0.331*** 
(0.071) 
0.231*** 
(0.063) 
0.229*** 
(0.059) 
0.252*** 
(0.054) 
Ratio 1 player A 
round 1 
 0.749*** 
(0.184) 
0.727*** 
(0.171) 
0.563*** 
(0.161) 
Ratio 2 player B 
round 1 
  0.477** 
(0.195) 
0.323* 
(0.182) 
Ratio 3 player A 
round 2 
   0.222 
(0.193) 
Ratio 4 player B 
round 2 
   0.473** 
(0.195) 
Insurance taken by 
player A 
   0.161* 
(0.082) 
Constant 1.664*** 
(0.214) 
1.420*** 
(0.186) 
1.226*** 
(0.190) 
1.056*** 
(0.178) 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.58 0.64 0.71 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10 percent level 
Interestingly, the first offer ratio and the final return ratio are the most important of our 
ratios of amount given to amount available to give and are both highly significant, with 
the coefficient higher on the opening offer than the final return. This result lends support 
to hypothesis H3, that player B will return a larger proportion where player A has offered 
a high amount of his available funds. Thus, our findings indicate that player A’s level of 
trust can be incentivised, increasing his reputation (supporting the reputation hypothesis 
                                               
6 Four specifications are reported here. A full set of results is available from the authors upon request. 
in the literature) which in turn increases player B’s reciprocity (supporting the reciprocity 
hypothesis in the literature).  
 
Table 4b Joint final balance - repeated game with insurance 
Dependent variable = Ln Joint Final balance. OLS estimation 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
N=35 games  Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Level of reward 0.418*** 
(0.075) 
0.286*** 
(0.057) 
0.286*** 
(0.057) 
0.291*** 
(0.054) 
Ratio 1 player A 
round 1 
 0.984*** 
(0.165) 
0.989*** 
(0.167) 
0.835*** 
(0.161) 
Ratio 2 player B 
round 1 
  -0.118 
(0.190) 
-0.293 
(0.183) 
Ratio 3 player A 
round 2 
   0.343* 
(0.194) 
Ratio 4 player B 
round 2 
   0.179** 
(0.194) 
Insurance taken by 
player A 
   0.186** 
(0.083) 
Constant 2.205*** 
(0.226) 
1.884*** 
(0.167) 
1.933*** 
(0.186) 
1.838*** 
(0.179) 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.74 0.74 0.78 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10 percent level 
 
We find that hypothesis H4 is not supported, as not all player A’s who were offered 
insurance took up the offer. We wondered why, given the opportunity to insure, more 
player A’s did not take up this opportunity. In this light of this puzzle, we have attempted 
to identify the determinants of taking up insurance, and in particular whether our 
measures of social capital taken in our pre-game survey could be influential. This was 
done by running a simple probit model.  
Table 5 shows the results of our probit model of the probability of taking insurance 
given that the insurance game was being played. Once again we test the robustness of our 
estimates by adding our covariates one at a time. We find no significant difference 
between males and females in the probability of insuring. Our correlates of trust, the 
World Values Survey measure of trust and whether the subject votes, are both significant 
and work in the direction we expected. That is,  participation in voting and being more 
trusting of others both are associated with a lower probability of taking up insurance. 
Thus it appears that voting - an indicator of community-oriented behaviour - leads to a 
higher probability of trusting behaviour and hence to a lower likelihood of insurance.  
 
Table 5: Probability of player A taking out insurance 
Dependent variable = Probability of taking insurance offer.  Probit estimation 
Specification: 1 2 3 
N=35 Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Coefficient 
(std error) 
Male 0.265 
(0.449) 
0.028 
(0.512) 
0.415 
(0.581) 
WVS trust  -0.801*** 
(0.281) 
-0.983*** 
(0.315) 
Vote   -1.249* 
(0.706) 
Constant -0.210 
(0.365) 
2.273** 
(0.970) 
2.851 
(1.083) 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.24 0.32 
***/**/* Indicates significance at the 1/5/10 percent level 
 
The World Values Survey trust measure, which has been claimed to be a weak 
measure of trust with respect to the amount sent by each player in the experimental trust 
game (Glaeser 2000) performs extremely well in these games as an indicator of whether 
or not player A will take advantage of an opportunity to insure. The coefficient on this 
measure is highly significant and also robust across specifications indicating that the 
more predisposed to trust, in a World Values Survey sense, is player A the less likely she 
is to seek to insure against losses. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we investigate whether trust can be incentivised; more specifically, 
whether introducing a third party who raises players’ risk efficacy can influence the level 
of trust demonstrated by the first player in a repeated Berg-Dickhaut-McCabe game. We 
conducted investment games under experimental conditions within the Department of 
Economics at the Universities of Sheffield and Glasgow during 2005/2006. Our results 
indicate that trust can be incentivised, in the sense that first-player offers within the 
context of a repeated BDM game are significantly larger if they show evidence that the 
fear of exploitation of their trust has been overcome by material incentives which 
increase their risk efficacy.  
We test four hypotheses and find support for our first three: in particular, that trust 
increases with the size of the multiplier offered as a return on the initial investment, 
reciprocity is increased where the initial offer is high and willingness to trust is also 
higher in cases where a third party offers insurance against the possibility that initial 
offers will not be reciprocated, which strengthens the first player’s risk efficacy. Our 
fourth hypothesis; that all players would take up insurance if offered, was not supported 
but led to the identification of determinants of taking up insurance, which were strongly 
negatively correlated with typical social capital measures, such as the World Values 
Survey measure of trust. Thus, it appears from this evidence that trust varies in relation 
not only to personal characteristics, which often cannot be altered, but in relation to 
institutions, which can. On this small-scale experimental evidence, there is an upward-
sloping supply curve, in relation not to trust – which indeed cannot be bought – but rather 
in relation to institutions which protect the truster’s risk efficacy, or defences against 
exploitation. These findings appear tempting but are urgently in need of further 
robustness-testing against a broader sample of respondents.  
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APPENDIX A: DATA DEFINITIONS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
GENDER:  male = 1, female=0 
AGE: The age, in years, of the respondent. 
STUDENT LOAN: Loan exceeds the statutory minimum. 1 = yes; 0= no. 
FAMILY MEANS TESTED: 1 = yes; 0 = no. 
STUDENT LEVEL: 1 = postgraduate; 0 = undergraduate. 
PERSONAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: 
Did you Vote in the last election or intend to vote in the next? 1=yes, 0= no.  
From the world values survey: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’: Coded 1-5 on a likert scale: 1 if can’t be too trusting 
through to 5 if most people can be trusted. 
 
APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
 
1: All participants convene in the ‘base room’. The overall procedure of the game is outlined i.e. the 
purpose of our experiments, how the game is to be played, and the structure of rewards for participants. 
2: Participants are divided into Player As and Player Bs. The experimenter assigns them into pairs, but the 
identity of these pairs is known only to the experimenter and monitors.  
3: Players A and B each go to their assigned rooms.  
4: A monitor lays out £5 on the table in coins and asks player A to offer any desired part of this to player B. 
The identity of the other player is not specified: Player A is only told that his/her ‘partner’ is a student 
within the University, that the amount invested will be doubled/ tripled/quadrupled, and that player B is 
free to return as much or as little as s/he desires.  
5: The amount offered, once multiplied, is then ‘transferred’ to Player B. The game is repeated once. 
6: Each round player A’s offer and player B’s return is recorded.  
7: A second monitor records Player B’s return. Each Player B receives an initial stake of £5. In addition 
s/he receives the multiplied offer from Player A.  S/he decides how much of this offer to return to Player A.  
8: At the conclusion of the game each player is informed of their ‘final balance’ and they are presented 
with a provisional IOU corresponding to this balance.  
9: In the insurance game we repeat the stages above but now player A is given the opportunity to take out 
insurance. They are asked “Do you wish to consider taking out insurance, to cover the possibility that you 
may not receive from player B as much as you offered? If you pay a premium of £1 you will get back the 
full amount you offered minus the premium should player B not return the full amount of your offer. If you 
pay a premium of 50p you will get back half of the amount you offered, minus the premium, if player B 
returns less than the amount you offered.” Player B is aware that they are participating in an insurance 
game but do not know whether player A has taken advantage of the option to insure.  
